On the Claim of the Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan to a Byzantine “Imperial” Title – A Historical and Legal Analysis
Legal Memorandum
To: Public
From: Legal Counsel, Royal House of Ghassan (Lebanon)
Date: May 21, 2025
Re: Claim of the Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan to a Byzantine “Imperial” Title – Historical and Legal Analysis
Issue
Is the Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan (the “House of Ghassan”) justified in claiming and using a Byzantine “imperial” title, and to what extent does such a claim have legitimacy under international law? This memorandum examines the historical, genealogical, and religious bases for the Ghassanid claim and analyzes any recognition or precedent in international law that might support or challenge the legality or legitimacy of using such imperial titles. The analysis is intended for a government audience evaluating the status and implications of this dynastic claim.
Background
The House of Ghassan asserts descent from the Ghassanid Dynasty, a pre-Islamic Arab Christian dynasty allied with the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. The Ghassanids ruled parts of the Levant (in modern Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) from around 220 CE until their last ruling branch was deposed in the 18th century. Historically, Ghassanid rulers served as Byzantine foederati (allies) on the empire’s frontier, protecting trade routes and buffering against rival powers. In 529 CE, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I granted the Ghassanid King al-Ḥārith (Flavius Arethas) an extraordinary honor – the highest imperial title ever bestowed upon a foreign ruler, along with the rank of patricius. Contemporary scholarship indicates this title was “Basileus” (Greek for “sovereign” or “Emperor”) of all Arabs, a unique distinction essentially recognizing the Ghassanid ruler as an imperial-ranked king over numerous Arab tribes under Byzantine overlordship. This historical episode underpins the House of Ghassan’s present use of the term “Imperial.”
After the Islamic conquests (7th century), the Ghassanids lost their Byzantine-backed domain, but branches of the dynasty persisted. By the 17th century, a Ghassanid-descended family (the El Chemor family) ruled small principalities in Mount Lebanon as local Sheikhs under Ottoman suzerainty. Ottoman authorities formally recognized the Ghassanid (El Chemor) chiefs’ titles and authority, allowing them to govern the Akoura and Zgharta regions until 1747 CE. Even after losing territorial rule, the family retained its titles. The modern claim is primarily advanced by HIRH Prince Gharios El Chemor of Ghassan Al-Nu’man VIII, who asserts direct lineage from the last Ghassanid Sheikh of Lebanon. Prince Gharios (born in 1973) has undertaken legal and scholarly efforts to validate his heritage and titles. Notably, in 2011 an international arbitration tribunal in Brazil affirmed his dynastic rights and title claims; its award (No. 0413/2011) was recognized by Brazilian courts and upheld as a judgment under the New York Arbitration Convention in 148 countries, including confirmation by a U.S. court in 2012.
Furthermore, the House of Ghassan incorporated as a non-profit organization (NGO) in the United States in 2011 to serve as the legal vehicle representing the dynasty, and it obtained U.N. ECOSOC consultative status in 2016. In 2019, the Republic of Lebanon officially recognized the House of Ghassan via Presidential Decree 5800/2019 (approved by Lebanon’s Council of Ministers) as a legal entity – essentially acknowledging the House as a heritage NGO and the titles of its chiefs in an official capacity. Lebanese authorities compared the House’s status to that of the Red Cross or the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, underscoring that while it is not a governing power, it is an internationally oriented organization with recognized standing. The current Ghassanid leadership operates primarily as a cultural, humanitarian, and inter-religious institution; indeed, the Head of House has publicly declared that since the family no longer rules territory, the Royal House functions as a secular, charitable umbrella organization rather than a political government-in-exile.
Against this backdrop, the House of Ghassan styles itself a “Sovereign Imperial and Royal House”, invoking both its imperial Byzantine legacy and its royal Arab lineage. The key questions are: what basis exists for the Ghassanids’ use of a Byzantine imperial title, and does international law recognize or permit any legal significance to such claims today?
Historical and Genealogical Basis for the Imperial Title Claim
Historical Basis: The claim to a Byzantine “imperial” title rests heavily on the events of 529 CE, when Emperor Justinian I conferred on the Ghassanid monarch the title Basileus (often translated as “Emperor” or “High King”) of the Arabs. This was an unprecedented grant – sources describe it as the highest imperial dignity ever awarded to a foreign ruler by Byzantium. In effect, the Ghassanid king was elevated above ordinary client-kings and acknowledged as having a rank comparable to an emperor (albeit under Byzantine supremacy). Notably, Procopius records that Justinian placed “as many tribes as possible” under al-Ḥārith’s command, making him an overlord of multiple Arab tribes, rather than merely a tribal chief. By the norms of late antiquity, an “empire” implied authority over multiple peoples or kingdoms under one sovereign. Thus, the Ghassanid ruler’s expanded dominion and the title Basileus signified a de facto imperial status (Basileia) within the Byzantine geopolitical sphere.
It is important to clarify that this title did not make the Ghassanid king a co-emperor of the Roman Empire; rather, it was an honorific recognizing his authority over Rome’s Arab allies. Byzantine protocol usually reserved Basileus for the Roman/Byzantine Emperor himself – indeed, until the 9th century, Christian rulers outside Constantinople were typically called rex (king) in Greek, not basileus. The exceptional use of Basileus for al-Ḥārith indicates the special esteem and quasi-imperial standing accorded to the Ghassanids. In short, the Ghassanid Dynasty can historically claim to be the only Arab dynasty to have been granted a Byzantine imperial title. This unique status is the foundation of referring to the Ghassanid head as an “Imperial” Highness and the house as an Imperial dynasty.
Additionally, the Ghassanids maintained sovereign attributes even as Byzantine vassals. Classical international law theorists note that being a tributary or vassal state did not necessarily extinguish a polity’s sovereignty. Emmerich de Vattel, for example, wrote that a weaker state in unequal alliance which “reserves to itself the sovereignty, or the right of governing its own body,” remains an independent state in the law of nations. By many accounts, the Ghassanids retained control of their internal affairs and territory (Jabiyah and surrounding lands) while serving as Byzantine foederati. They met the Byzantine emperors “on equal footing – as comrades in arms,” according to historian Gene Gurney. Thus, one can argue the Ghassanid kingdom was sovereign in its own right and imperial in scope (since it led a confederation of tribes) even before its demise. The House of Ghassan invokes this history to justify the imperial epithet.
In addition to ruling the Levant, the House of Ghassan also produced the Imperial House of Nikephoros I, the short-lived Byzantine imperial dynasty founded by Emperor Nikephoros I (reigned 802–811 CE). Importantly, Nikephoros I was reported in Arab and Syriac sources to be a descendant of the Ghassanid Arab kings, specifically descended from King Jabala VI ibn al-Ayham, the last Ghassanid ruler of the Levant. Historians like Irfan Shahîd note that Emperor Nikephoros explicitly invoked his Ghassanid lineage; one chronicle records that he even used the name “Jafna” (after Jafna ibn `Amr, founder of the Ghassanid dynasty) to emphasize that he was the head of the Ghassanid royal house by blood. By assuming the purple, Nikephoros I effectively brought the Ghassanid line into the Byzantine imperial succession, at least by his own claim. When Nikephoros I and his direct heirs died out – his only son (Emperor Staurakios) left no issue and his lineage was extinguished by 813 CE – the question arises to whom the imperial dignities of his house devolved. The Ghassanid legal position is that those titles and dignity reverted to the broader Ghassanid dynasty once the Nikephorian line had no surviving heirs. In essence, Nikephoros had claimed the imperial title “Basileus” as a Ghassanid, so upon his line’s extinction, the headship of the “House of Nikephoros” (i.e., the Ghassanid Imperial claim in Byzantium) fell back to the senior surviving branch of the Ghassanid family. Indeed, a Ghassanid Royal Decree recounts that “Emperor Nikephoros I, Roman Emperor of the East, claimed to be a direct descendant and heir of King Jabalah VI and thus head of the Ghassanid dynasty; and when all of His Majesty’s heirs were killed or incapacitated by usurpers, the heads of the Ghassanid Dynasty remained the legitimate heirs of the Imperial House of Nikephoros”. Therefore, the Ghassanid House “historically and lawfully uses the Imperial dignity” of that Byzantine legacy. In practical terms, the modern Prince of Ghassan is considered “ex officio Head of the Imperial House of Nikephoros I (Phokas)”, continuing that title by right of dynastic succession. This legal reasoning reflects principles of hereditary succession: an imperial title, once vested in an ancestor who had no surviving progeny, passes to the next lawful heir of the bloodline (in this case, the Ghassanid princes who were kin of Nikephoros). Thus, the Ghassanid claimant today bases his Byzantine imperial titles on this hereditary devolution from the Nikephoros dynasty, alongside the ancient Roman bestowal of “Basileus Aravên” (Emperor of the Arabs) on the Ghassanid king al-Harith VI by Justinian in 528 CE.
The Ghassanid dynasty’s imperial claims were again revived in the 13th century. Historical records show that Leo Gabalas – a Byzantine Greek lord who seized control of Rhodes after the Fourth Crusade – took on the title “Caesar” while ruling the island. Contemporary Byzantine chroniclers and modern historians confirm that Leo Gabalas styled himself “Caesar” and lord of Rhodes, operating as a virtually independent prince (though he sometimes acknowledged the Nicaean emperors' suzerainty). Leo Gabalas’s reign (circa 1203–1240s) is significant to the Ghassanid narrative because he is held to be a descendant of the Ghassanid royal line. “Gabalas” is the Hellenized form of “Jabala”, a name borne by the Ghassanid kings. (Notably, Jabala IV ibn al-Harith, a 6th-century Ghassanid phylarch, was known as “Gabalas” in Greek sources.) This linguistic and genealogical link suggests that the Gabalas family preserved their Ghassanid ancestry over centuries. Indeed, Leo Gabalas and his brother John were “proclaimed descendants of Ghassanid King Jablah” in various accounts. Under Leo’s de facto rule, Rhodes became a Ghassanid-claimant principality: one Byzantine history even refers to him as a “Ghassanid Emperor” on Rhodes. Thus, the Ghassanid heirs acquired the distinction of “Caesar of Rhodes” – an imperial-ranked title – through Leo Gabalas’s legacy. Independent scholarly references corroborate that during Leo Gabalas’s regime on Rhodes he bore the lofty title of Caesar, signifying a quasi-imperial status. The Ghassanid claimants include this episode in their dynastic honors, counting it as the third instance (after 528 and 802 CE) in which their house attained imperial rank. This claim is not solely based on their own chronicles; it finds support in historical documents and numismatic evidence (coins of Leo Gabalas inscribed with his titles) confirming that Rhodes was ruled by a Caesar from the Gabalas (Ghassanid) family. In summary, independent validation exists that a Ghassanid descendant held the Byzantine title Caesar while ruling Rhodes, adding further credence to the House of Ghassan’s inherited titulary rights beyond their original Arab kingdom.
Genealogical Basis: The legitimacy of the current claimant family is grounded in documented lineage from the last recognized Ghassanid rulers. The Lebanese El Chemor family is widely acknowledged by historians to descend from Ghassanid royalty. An authoritative Encyclopedia of Maronite Families (published by Notre Dame University – Louaize in Lebanon) confirms the El Chemor family’s chronicles: the Ottoman governors granted the El Chemor Sheikhs hereditary rule over the Koura/Zgharta region (in today’s Lebanon) from 1641 until 1747, when their rule ended under Daher al-Omar’s rebellion. The encyclopedia traces the family’s origins to the medieval Ghassanid line; notably it identifies an early ancestor “Gharios El Chemor” – from whom the current Prince Gharios takes his regnal name – and explains how branches of the family spread in Lebanon. These scholarly records bolster the claim that the present Head of House is the lawful heir by blood (jus sanguinis) of the Ghassanid kings and princes.
In modern times, Prince Gharios El Chemor’s genealogical claims have undergone scrutiny and received third-party validation. The Augustan Society, Inc., a respected American genealogical and chivalric society, conducted years of study and formally recognized the Royal House of Ghassan’s lineage and its dynastic orders. Moreover, multiple historians of Middle Eastern nobility have provided sworn affidavits supporting the El Chemor family’s royal descent and rights. For instance, the world’s leading scholar on Arab royal succession (Dr. Joseph Kéchichian, author of works on ruling families) and a prominent Maronite historian (Fr. Antoine Daou) have each independently affirmed the Ghassanid pedigree and titles in expert statements. Such evidence indicates the genealogical basis for the claim is robust and well-documented, lending credibility to the House’s continuity as a deposed sovereign family. No contrary genealogical claimant to the Ghassanid legacy has surfaced with comparable documentation, so the El Chemor line appears to be the sole surviving line of Ghassanid royalty recognized in the historical record. This strengthens the argument that the “imperial” title – insofar as the Ghassanid kings held it – can legitimately vest in the present Head of the House by inheritance.
Religious and Cultural Bases for the Claim
Historical Religious Role: Religion intertwined deeply with the Ghassanid dynasty’s identity and could be seen as part of the justification for its titles. The Ghassanids were notable as one of the earliest Arab Christian dynasties, adhering first to Miaphysite Christianity (Syriac Orthodox tradition) and later (some branches) to Melkite and Maronite Christianity. In the 6th century, King al-Ḥārith ibn Jabalah famously championed the Miaphysite (Jacobite) cause, using his authority to protect the Syrian Miaphysite Church which was persecuted by the Orthodox Byzantine hierarchy. He helped revive the Syrian Jacobite patriarchate, earning admiration from his co-religionists. Thus, the Ghassanid kings were seen not only as political allies of Byzantium but as defenders of Eastern Christianity in a hostile environment. This religious legacy bolstered their status – they were viewed as God-appointed guardians of the faith in the Orient, a role analogous to Byzantium’s own self-image as “defender of Christendom.” The imperial title conferred on the Ghassanid ruler by Justinian can partly be attributed to this role – rewarding his loyalty in both the spiritual and temporal realms. In other words, the “imperial” dignity had a religious imprimatur, signifying a Christian kingship under the aegis of the Christian Roman Emperor.
After the rise of Islam, many Ghassanids (including possibly the last phylarch, Jabalah) refused to abandon Christianity and eventually migrated into Byzantine territory. The Christian Ghassanid identity persisted through the medieval period, especially in Mount Lebanon where the El Chemor princes were allied with the Maronite Church. Their rule in Lebanon (17th–18th centuries) coincided with the Maronite patriarchal influence, and church chronicles honor the El Chemor sheikhs as Christian princes who provided refuge to their coreligionists. This enduring Christian identity contributes to the House of Ghassan’s self-justification: they claim a kind of spiritual mandate to continue their ancestors’ work of fostering inter-religious harmony and protecting Christian communities. It is a non-territorial, moral basis for their legitimacy in modern times.
Modern Religious Recognition: In recent years, the House of Ghassan’s claim and status have received remarkable acknowledgments from religious authorities, adding moral weight (if not legal force) to their legitimacy. Notably, in October 2020 the Global Imams Council (GIC) – the world’s largest NGO body of Muslim clerics and scholars, spanning both Sunni and Shia leaders – issued a formal decree recognizing the sovereignty of the Ghassanid Royal House and all its historical titles, under the leadership of Prince Gharios. This move is extraordinary: an international assembly of Muslim leaders effectively affirmed a Christian royal dynasty’s historical rights. The GIC’s recognition was part of an interfaith initiative; concurrently, the Council signed a memorandum of understanding with the House of Ghassan pledging mutual support to protect religious minorities (with the Ghassanid Prince committing to protect Muslims in Christian-majority lands and the Imams to protect Christians in Muslim-majority lands). Such an endorsement, while not a state act, is unprecedented in the religious sphere and bolsters the House’s moral and cultural legitimacy. It suggests that prominent figures in the Muslim world view the Ghassanid dynasty as a genuine historical sovereign house worthy of respect – lending the title “Sovereign Imperial” a degree of acceptance in interfaith diplomacy.
On the Christian side, the House of Ghassan has also been recognized or honored by major ecclesiastical institutions. Prince Gharios has been invested as a knight in the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem, a Papal order of knighthood under Vatican patronage. He has been received by high-ranking church leaders (for example, the head of the Albanian Orthodox Church, Archbishop Anastasios, publicly hosted Ghassanid representatives in 2017). The World Evangelical Alliance Secretary-General (Bishop Thomas Schirrmacher) serves as President of the Ghassanid Royal Academy of Arts & Sciences, reflecting broad Christian support across denominations. These connections to Christian authorities, while informal, reinforce the House’s standing as an authentic custodian of a Christian royal legacy. The religious basis for the claim, therefore, lies in a continuity of purpose and recognition: the dynasty historically served a religious protective role, and today religious communities acknowledge the dynasty’s symbolic leadership in promoting faith-based cooperation and heritage. While religious approval does not confer legal title under international law, it contributes to the perception of legitimacy and the cultural justification for using ancient titles. In diplomatic practice, states sometimes take note of such factors in extending courtesies (e.g. addressing a pretender by title or involving them in cultural events). At minimum, the interfaith endorsements help demonstrate that the House’s use of an imperial title is not frivolous or self-serving, but linked to ongoing humanitarian and cultural work – a key point the House itself emphasizes.
International Law Considerations (Sovereignty, Titles, and Recognition)
Sovereignty and Claims in Exile: Modern international law generally centers on states as the subjects of sovereign rights. Under the widely accepted criteria of the Montevideo Convention (1933), a state must have (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) an effective government, and (d) capacity for foreign relations. The Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan today does not meet these criteria – it is not a governmental authority over a territory or population, but rather a dynastic institution and NGO. Thus, in the strict sense, it cannot claim to be a “state” or a sovereign entity in the international system. No present-day nation-state of “Ghassan” exists, and the Byzantine Empire has long ceased to exist, so there is no active throne or legal jurisdiction attached to the title that Prince Gharios claims. This is the primary challenge to the legal efficacy of the imperial title: sovereignty in international law is tied to effective control of territory or a people, which the House of Ghassan lacks.
However, international law does recognize the concept of governments or sovereigns in exile in certain circumstances. A monarch or government ousted by force can remain the de jure sovereign if not legally abdicated or supplanted by a recognized successor. Classical jurists like Textor and others have asserted that a king who is driven from his kingdom retains his right to the throne (for himself and heirs) until he either renounces it or it is extinguished by lawful means. In practice, during World War II many exiled governments (e.g. the exiled governments of Poland, the Netherlands, etc.) were treated as continuing sovereigns and exercised powers in exile with the support of allies. By analogy, the House of Ghassan positions itself as a deposed sovereign house that never relinquished its claim to its historical realms and titles. There is some theoretical support for this position: a deposed monarch who has not consented to transfer sovereignty can be seen as retaining a de jure claim, even if it is not effective on the ground. This falls under the doctrinal concepts of jus majestatis (the right of a sovereign to be respected as such) and jus honorum (the right to confer honors). According to the House’s legal advisors, international law does not strip deposed sovereigns of their dignity or their ability to bestow titles, even if the exercise of those rights is constrained in practice. For example, one finds that Austria’s domestic law forbids the former Habsburg Imperial family from using their titles or even the nobiliary particle “von,” yet no state or international law denies that the Habsburgs were once imperial sovereigns. The titles in exile persist in a sort of legal limbo: they have heritage value and can be used socially, but they carry no governing authority unless a restoration occurs.
In the Ghassanid context, no treaty or abdication ever formally ended the family’s sovereign rights – their rule ended by force and political change (Ottoman centralization, then colonial-era nation-state formation). The Ghassanid heirs did not sign away their claims. Under this line of reasoning, Prince Gharios can be viewed as a Sovereign-in-Exile, maintaining a de jure claim to the titles of his ancestors (e.g. “Prince of Ghassan,” possibly even “King/Emperor of the Ghassanids”) even though these titles have no de facto sovereignty attached. It is crucial to note that this status, while arguable under historical jurisprudence, is not explicitly codified in any modern international legal instrument. It relies on custom and writings of jurists rather than positive law. Moreover, the notion of a sovereign-in-exile typically has been applied when there is an expectation of return or continued diplomatic recognition by other states (as with the Baltic states under Soviet occupation, or kings deposed by war). In the Ghassanids’ case, centuries have passed, and no state actively recognizes them as the government of a territory – thus their claim is largely symbolic in international legal terms.
Legality of Using Ancient Titles: There is no international law prohibiting an individual from using historical royal titles, provided it is not done to perpetrate fraud or in a manner that violates the laws of the country where it is used. Many countries allow courtesy use of titles as part of one’s name or social identity. For instance, pretenders to various abolished thrones (France, Italy, Russia, etc.) routinely use titles like Count, Prince, Duke, even “Emperor” in exile (the Napoleon family claimants styled themselves Emperor of the French, etc.), without legal penalty. Such usage is generally considered a private matter. Where conflict can arise is if someone falsely presents a title as having legal authority. In the House of Ghassan’s case, they have been careful to present their titles as cultural and historical – the Prince’s passport is that of a regular citizen (e.g. Brazilian or Lebanese, as applicable), not a fictitious “Ghassanid passport.” The House explicitly disavows any intent to interfere in state sovereignty or politics. This transparency means their self-styling as “Imperial and Royal” is not unlawful; it falls under protected expression of identity and heritage.
It is worth noting that domestic laws vary: some republican jurisdictions (like France or Austria) have laws against using former royal titles in official contexts, whereas others (like the UK or Spain) have no issue with it socially. As mentioned, Austria even prohibits Habsburg descendants from using noble titles by law. In Lebanon, by contrast, the government itself now formally acknowledges the El Chemor family’s titles – for example, a 2022 decree by the Lebanese Ministry of Interior recognizes Prince Selim El Chemor as the head of the family in Lebanon, explicitly using his title “Prince (Amir) Sheikh” in the official document. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry and Presidency have addressed Prince Gharios by his full royal titles in correspondence and during official events. This indicates that at least one U.N. member state accepts the legitimacy of the Ghassanid titles within its jurisdiction. Such state-level recognition, while rare, provides a supportive precedent. International legal doctrine generally holds that it is within each state’s discretion to recognize or ignore noble titles (especially foreign or historical ones). No international treaty compels states to honor such titles, but likewise none forbids states from giving recognition as a matter of honor or tradition. In the Ghassanids’ case, Lebanon’s recognition (and the absence of any protest from other states) suggests that the use of the title “Imperial and Royal House” is at least tolerated internationally, and even formally respected in diplomatic protocol on certain occasions. For example, when the Ghassanid delegation was received by Lebanon’s President in 2017, state media referred to Prince Gharios by his title and treated the visit as an audience to a Royal House. This level of acknowledgment, while not amounting to sovereignty, lends credence under international practice that the titles are historically grounded and non-controversial to acknowledge in ceremonial or cultural settings.
Fons Honorum (Fountain of Honors): One legal aspect of an imperial or royal claim is the right to confer honors – knighthoods, titles of nobility, etc. In monarchical systems, this fons honorum traditionally belongs to the sovereign. The House of Ghassan contends that because it was a sovereign dynasty, it possesses jus honorum in perpetuity, meaning the Prince can lawfully create and grant chivalric orders and noble titles. Under international law, this is a gray area. There is no international court that adjudicates the validity of noble titles or orders of chivalry. It largely comes down to whether recipients and third parties accept them. Some argue that once a monarchy is definitively abolished and its prerogatives subsumed by a republic, the former royal family no longer has legal authority to bestow new titles (they become pretenders). Others, like certain scholars cited by the House of Ghassan, argue that because jus majestatis and jus honorum are personal sovereign rights independent of territory, they pass to heirs even if the throne is lost, and there is “absolutely no legal impediment” for a deposed dynasty’s head to create new honors. In practice, the validity of such titles is in the eye of the beholder: for instance, if a Ghassanid prince grants an order of knighthood to a foreign citizen, it is up to that person’s government whether to recognize or allow its use. In the case of the Ghassanids, we have evidence that at least one of their Orders (the Equestrian Order of Michael Archangel) was formally recognized by the President of Lebanon, who personally accepted induction into that order. This act effectively signals Lebanon’s acceptance of the Ghassanid Prince’s fons honorum. It sets a precedent that could be cited if questions arise elsewhere: a head of state treated a Ghassanid honor as legitimate. Nonetheless, outside such specific recognitions, one must caution that international law does not universally validate the honors granted by non-reigning royal claimants. Each state can choose to accept them (often as foreign decorations or courtesy titles) or to consider them of no legal standing.
In summary, under the lens of international law, the use of the Byzantine imperial title by the House of Ghassan is largely symbolic and honorific – it does not equate to being an emperor in the modern legal sense. The claim finds support in principles of dynastic rights and historical sovereignty in exile, which suggest the title is not unlawful to claim, and may indeed be legitimately held in a de jure sense by inheritance. At the same time, the lack of territorial jurisdiction and limited recognition mean the title has no operative legal power internationally.
The House of Ghassan’s approach – to use the titles in cultural and charitable activities – aligns with what international law would view as permissible private conduct. Should the House attempt something more concrete (e.g. issuing official documents as if it were a government), it would likely find no legal recognition and could run afoul of laws (for instance, issuance of passports or coins by non-states is generally not recognized). There is no indication the House is pursuing such actions. Indeed, its public stance of working “with de facto constituted leaders” and not seeking any regime change demonstrates a respect for the current international order. This reduces any legal conflict that might otherwise arise from an imperial claim.
Recognition and Precedent in International Doctrine
Recognition by States: The legitimacy of royal titles in the post-monarchical context often hinges on recognition – either explicit acknowledgment by states or implicit acceptance through protocol and courtesy. In the case of the Ghassanid imperial claim, Lebanon’s recognition in 2019 is a significant precedent. By issuing a presidential decree recognizing the “Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan” as an international organization representing the Ghassanid dynasty, and by naming the princes in official documents, the Lebanese government effectively set a precedent of a U.N. member state according a measure of official legitimacy to the House’s titles. It’s important to emphasize that Lebanon recognized the House as an NGO with cultural/diplomatic functions, not as a sovereign state. Nevertheless, the process involved high-level vetting by multiple ministries (Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Security) and approval by the Cabinet and President. The thoroughness of this process indicates the Lebanese state understood the historical and legal nature of the Ghassanid claims and was comfortable treating the House as a continuation of a historic royal family. In essence, Lebanon’s action can be viewed as an official recognition of the Ghassanid titles as legitimate hereditary titles (much as some countries officially recognize certain foreign titles for use or grant legal status to orders of chivalry). This recognition is likely to carry persuasive weight if the House of Ghassan seeks similar treatment elsewhere, though it is not binding on other states.
Beyond Lebanon, no other country is publicly known to have issued a formal decree recognizing the Ghassanid titles. However, the House of Ghassan often highlights that it has received acknowledgment or support from various international quarters short of formal recognition. For instance, it has been accredited to U.N. conferences due to its ECOSOC status, and its representatives have been welcomed at events by governments and international organizations (often in the context of interfaith dialogue or cultural programs). In diplomatic protocol, there is precedent for treating the heads of formerly reigning houses with courtesy titles – e.g., addressing the Count of Paris as “Your Royal Highness” or inviting pretenders to ceremonial events. Such courtesies, while not constituting legal recognition, show a customary respect for historical titles. The Ghassanid Prince has similarly been invited to and involved in international forums (including United Nations side events, interreligious councils, etc.), indicating that his title does not pose an obstacle to engagement. As a parallel, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, though it lost its territory in 1798, is still recognized by many states and the U.N. as a sovereign entity for certain purposes. The Ghassanid House’s status is not on the same level – it has no diplomatic relations or observer status at the U.N. – but Lebanon’s comparison of the House’s standing to that of the Red Cross and Order of Malta suggests an analogy that the Ghassanids are considered a sovereign heritage body. This is an unusual but not entirely unheard-of status in international practice. It echoes how some international orders of chivalry (like the Order of the Holy Sepulchre or Order of the Golden Fleece) and former ruling families (like the Romanovs’ Romanov Family Association) operate transnationally with tacit recognition.
Precedents of Title Legitimacy: International legal doctrine itself does not pronounce on the “legitimacy” of monarchical titles – it leaves such matters to history and national law. Yet, we can look to analogous cases for guidance:
Numerous deposed monarchies continue to use their titles and have organizations or foundations representing their legacies. For example, the Romanov family (former Russian imperial house) is organized as a private association; while Russia does not officially recognize imperial titles, the family is globally respected and its members are often accorded the style of princes in social usage. The lack of formal legal standing does not erase the cultural legitimacy of their titles.
Kingdoms in exile during WWII set a precedent that a government in exile could still issue valid acts (e.g., the Polish government-in-exile’s decrees were later accepted by postwar courts for certain matters). This hinged on those exiles being recognized by other states at the time. In the Ghassanids’ case, there was no continuous government-in-exile after the 18th century; nevertheless, the principle that sovereignty can lie dormant is invoked by analogy.
International tribunals or arbitrations have occasionally been used to settle nobility claims. The Ghassanid arbitration in 2011 is one such example in a modern setting where a private international law mechanism was used to affirm a dynastic claim. Because the arbitration award was recognized by courts in Brazil and the United States, one could argue there is a transnational legal judgment acknowledging Prince Gharios’s right to his titles. Prince Gharios El Chemor’s royal and imperial titles were judicially acknowledged in the United States by enforcing a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention. In 2012, the Los Angeles County Superior Court (Judge Matthew C. St. George) confirmed the Brazilian arbitration decision recognizing him as Head of the Ghassanid House and heir to its titles. Again, on March 15, 2016, the Los Angeles Superior Court (Judge Mark Borenstein) granted a petition invoking the same arbitral award, thereby recognizing and enforcing Prince Gharios’ Ghassanid titles under U.S. law. These court orders—unopposed and citing the 1958 New York Convention—give the arbitral award the effect of a judgment, cementing the Prince’s legally recognized right to use the historical Ghassanid royal and imperial titles. (Case nos. BS-135337 (2012) and BS-159726 (2016. The U.S. courts’ acceptance of the award on such grounds underscores that this was more than a routine name change; it was a judicial confirmation of the honorific “Prince of Ghassan” and related titles. This 2016 confirmation, building on the 2012 precedent, is documented as part of the legal memorandum and verifies that the Ghassanid Dynasty’s claims have been judicially validated in a U.S. forum under international arbitral enforcement law. While this is not international law per se (it’s domestic enforcement of a private award), it is a creative use of legal process that gives the Ghassanid claim a veneer of judicial approval across jurisdictions. Few pretenders have such a court-confirmed status. This could serve as a model for other non-reigning families to legitimize their claims within the bounds of law.
The Ghassanids also cite scholarly opinion that in international law “no literature or jurisprudence” limits the rights of deposed sovereigns to their dignity and honors. In fact, the argument is made that either one accepts a deposed dynasty’s sovereign prerogatives continue by inheritance or one does not – but if one does, then there is no half-measure whereby they can only use old titles and not new ones. This stance, while not universally endorsed, finds support in writings of jurists like Stephen P. Kerr and in the practice of some royal houses that have created new knightly orders long after losing power (e.g., the exiled Bourbon-Two Sicilies family conferring orders of Saint George). There has been no international legal challenge to these practices, implying a degree of toleration or implied legitimacy.
Challenges to Legitimacy: On the other side of the ledger, one must note that many observers view self-proclaimed titles with skepticism. The House of Ghassan has faced accusations (mostly in informal forums) of being a “self-styled” or fraudulent royalty. Some commentators have pointed to the Prince’s background (he grew up in the diaspora) to question his authenticity. These criticisms, however, do not carry legal weight if the historical evidence supports the claim – which, as outlined, it does. A government assessing the situation should be mindful of fraudulent orders of chivalry or false noble claims, which unfortunately exist. In this case, the extensive documentation, the Lebanese government’s involvement, and endorsements by scholars and religious bodies distinguish the House of Ghassan from mere self-invented claimants. Nonetheless, international legal doctrine would challenge any attempt by the House to assert rights against a state. For example, if the Prince of Ghassan asserted a claim to territory in Syria or Lebanon by virtue of his title, it would not be upheld; modern international law respects the territorial integrity of states and does not entertain historical feudal claims. The Ghassanid House explicitly does not claim any governing authority over territory today, which is a prudent position. Their claim, as it stands, is non-justiciable – it doesn’t seek to override any state’s sovereignty, only to maintain a heritage and perform certain ceremonial and charitable functions. In the absence of an adverse claim or conflict, there is simply no case in international law to dispute; titles and honors exist in a permissive space, where those who acknowledge them may do so, and those who do not face no obligation.
Finally, it is important to place the “Byzantine imperial” aspect in context. The Byzantine Empire itself left no universally recognized succession or custodian of its titles after its fall in 1453. Different entities have claimed to inherit its legacy (the Ottoman Sultans adopted the title “Caesar of Rome”; Russian Tsars called Moscow the “Third Rome”; even the Kings of France at one point used the title “Emperor of the East” ceremonially). None of these claims were resolved by law – they were matters of power or propaganda. The Ghassanid claim to a Byzantine imperial title is unique in that it does not claim to be the Emperor of Byzantium, but an imperial title granted by Byzantium. In a sense, it is easier to justify, because it does not compete with any existing sovereignty. There is no “Byzantine Empire” today whose titles are regulated by law, so using one of its historical titles (Basileus) harms no legal interest. The claim stands on its historical validity alone. International law is largely silent on such matters, except that it would treat the title as a matter of historical record and personal identity.
External Validations
Continuous Recognition by Ottoman and Lebanese Authorities: Despite the Ghassanid dynasty’s loss of territorial rule in 1747, the El Chemor family (the Ghassanid heirs in Lebanon) continued to enjoy official recognition of their princely titles under subsequent regimes. Ottoman authorities did not extinguish the family’s rank after deposition; however, Ottoman-era documents show the title “Sheikh (Prince) El Chemor” still in legal use long after 1747. One such official document (c. 1900, bearing an Ottoman stamp) refers to Sheikh Nassif El Chemor by title, notably over 150 years after the last El Chemor ruler and even decades after nobility titles were formally abolished in Mount Lebanon in 1858. This indicates de facto Ottoman recognition of their hereditary princely status well into the late Ottoman period. In the modern era, the Republic of Lebanon has likewise continuously acknowledged the El Chemor family’s historical titles. Lebanese civil records and identity documents have included the honorific. For example, a recent Lebanese passport (No. 184320) issued to the late Sheikh Nassif El Chemor (d. 2017) explicitly shows his title, demonstrating that the Lebanese state “kept recognizing the titles of the El Chemor family” over two centuries after their 18th-century dethronement. An official Lebanese government decree in 2019 further recognized the Ghassanid Royal House by authorizing a registered branch in Lebanon – the decree explicitly names HRH Prince (Sheikh) Selim El Chemor as head of the House’s branch, thereby using and affirming his title in an official capacity. Indeed, it is recorded that “the Lebanese Republic (and all previous regimes, including the Ottoman Empire) has been recognizing the El Chemor titles since the family’s deposition”, through multiple documents such as passports, government decrees, and official correspondence. This continuous recognition, from Ottoman times up to the present Lebanese Republic, provides documented legal legitimacy to the family’s princely (sheikh) titles and has been noted by scholars and governmental media. (Notably, a 2014 bulletin of the Lebanese Ministry of Information references the El Chemor (Ghassanid) family’s titles and heritage, indicating the government’s acknowledgment of the family’s historical status.
Unione della Nobiltà Bizantina, IAGI, and ICOC: Crucially, the Ghassanid imperial titles have been given credence by reputable international nobiliary and chivalric bodies, underscoring that these claims are taken seriously outside the family. In particular, the Unione della Nobiltà Bizantina (“Union of Byzantine Nobility”) – a European association under the patronage of the Ecumenical Patriarchate that gathers legitimate Byzantine imperial descendants and nobles – has formally recognized the Royal House of Ghassan among its ranks. The Unione, which functions as a collegial body for Eastern Roman (Byzantine) noble lineages, includes the Ghassanid princely house as the continuation of a sovereign Byzantine dynasty. This recognition effectively means the Ghassanid prince is acknowledged as an Imperial dynast in the Byzantine context by a broader community of historians and nobles. Moreover, the Unione della Nobiltà Bizantina partners with leading heraldic and chivalric institutions. It maintains official agreements with the Istituto Araldico Genealogico Italiano (IAGI) – Italy’s preeminent genealogical and heraldic institute – and collaborates with the International Commission on Orders of Chivalry (ICOC). (The ICOC is an authoritative body that evaluates the legitimacy of orders of knighthood worldwide.) The Unione’s president, H.S.H. Prince Roberto Spreti Malmesi (Prince Griffo Focas), is involved with the ICOC, underscoring the close ties between these organizations. The fact that the Ghassanid titles are recognized by the Unione Bizantina, which is aligned with the IAGI and ICOC, validates the House’s claims strongly. In practice, this means the Ghassanid royal titles and orders have passed scrutiny by external experts and have been accepted as legitimate within international nobility registers. For example, the Aristocratic Council of Aristocrazia Europea (which liaises with Unione Bizantina and ICOC) automatically accepts foreign noble titles that are certified by bodies like the ICOC or emanate from the Unione della Nobiltà Bizantina (Eastern Roman Empire). This explicit inclusion places the Ghassanid Imperial and Royal House on the same footing as historically authenticated noble families, as recognized by European genealogical authorities. Together, the Unione’s recognition and its partnerships with IAGI and ICOC serve as objective evidence that the Ghassanid imperial titles are not self-proclaimed novelties but are acknowledged by peer-reviewed institutions in nobiliary lawaristocraziaeu.blogspot.com. Such endorsements are highly influential when presenting the case to government bodies, as they show that neutral arbiters of nobility and chivalry consider the Prince of Ghassan’s titles rooted in legitimate historical rights and continuous recognition.
Conclusion
In neutral evaluation, the Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan’s claim to a Byzantine imperial title has substantial historical and genealogical justification, but its standing under modern international law is primarily honorary rather than sovereign. Historically, the Ghassanid dynasty was undeniably real and was distinguished by receiving an imperial designation from the Byzantine Emperor – a fact supported by scholarly evidence. The current head of the House has a documented lineage to those rulers, and the family’s princely status was continuously recognized in local contexts for centuries, providing a solid genealogical pedigree. Religious and cultural validations, such as the Global Imams Council’s 2020 decree and various church honors, add moral legitimacy to the claim in the eyes of communities and suggest a continuity of the dynasty’s historic role. These factors combine to make the Ghassanid title more credible than many other dormant titles, and they explain why at least one sovereign government (Lebanon) and the United Nations (via NGO accreditation) have been comfortable acknowledging the House’s status.
However, from an international law perspective, titles alone do not equate to juridical sovereignty. The Ghassanid House is not a state and does not enjoy the rights reserved to states – it has no seat at the U.N. as a state, cannot sign treaties as a state, and has no enforceable claims on territory or governance. Its use of the imperial title is legally benign: international law neither prohibits such use nor assigns it any consequence. The House’s claim could be characterized as a legitimate dynastic claim in historical terms, maintained within the framework of an NGO in the modern era. This is supported by the doctrine that deposed monarchs can retain de jure sovereignty in exile unless relinquished, but tempered by the reality that such sovereignty is largely theoretical without broad recognition. In practice, recognition is key. Here, the House of Ghassan has achieved unusual recognition for a non-reigning family (e.g., formal recognition by a republic, respect from international religious leaders, etc.), strengthening its legitimacy even while it remains non-sovereign in the Westphalian sense.
In evaluating the legitimacy of using the Byzantine “imperial” title, a government body should note:
The title is rooted in verifiable history (it is not an invented fantasy title, but one granted by an emperor).
The genealogical continuity of the claimants is supported by credible evidence.
The House’s current activities and posture are consistent with international law’s expectations for deposed dynasties – i.e. they are cultural and humanitarian in nature, not attempting to usurp governmental functions.
There is no international legal bar to using such a title; issues of its recognition are a matter of diplomacy and national law, not international prohibition.
Precedents show that other dynastic claims have been peacefully maintained and sometimes honored (e.g. ex-royals being allowed courtesy titles, orders like the Order of Malta operating with sovereign-like status), suggesting that the Ghassanid claim fits within a tolerated practice.
That said, the claim’s legitimacy is largely symbolic. In the absence of an actual Empire or Kingdom of Ghassan, the title “Imperial and Royal” does not confer any governing authority. Any attempt to derive legal rights or privileges from the title (beyond protocolary honors) would likely be challenged or ignored under international law. For example, no imperial immunity or diplomatic status automatically attaches to Prince Gharios’s “sovereign” title in foreign courts – he is not a head of state of a recognized nation. The House’s own statements acknowledge this reality and present the organization as subject to the laws of the countries it operates in. This acknowledgment actually strengthens the House’s position, as it demonstrates good faith and a lack of pretension to unlawful authority.
In conclusion, the Byzantine imperial title claim of the House of Ghassan can be deemed historically authentic and arguably sustained by principles of dynastic rights, and its use in ceremonial and charitable contexts is justified and mostly uncontested. Under international law, while the title has no operative effect without a state, it is not illegitimate to hold or use, especially given the specific recognitions it has garnered. A government assessing this matter could reasonably recognize the House of Ghassan as a historical royal house and treat its titles as a matter of courtesy and cultural heritage, much as Lebanon has done. There is precedent and doctrinal support for according respect to such titles, provided it is clearly understood that this does not imply any political authority. In sum, the Ghassanid claim represents a rare continuity of an ancient title into the modern era – its justification lies in history and law’s deference to heritage, and it stands as a legal oddity that international law accommodates through the flexibility of recognition and the absence of any rule against it. Any challenge to the legitimacy of the title would likely be historical or political, not legal, as international law itself ultimately leaves the question of such titles to the realm of national discretion and international comity.
Endnotes (Sources):
Justinian I’s grant of imperial rank to the Ghassanid king in 529 CE is recorded by historians; it is described as “the highest imperial title that was ever bestowed upon a foreign ruler”.
Procopius noted that Emperor Justinian placed numerous Arab tribes under Ghassanid King al-Ḥārith’s command, effectively elevating him to “Basileus (Emperor) of the Arabs,” ruling over multiple peoples.
The Ghassanids continued as Byzantine-allied kings (phylarchs) until defeat by the Muslim armies in 636; the last Ghassanid ruler Jabalah ibn al-Ayham withdrew into Anatolia after the Islamic conquest.
The Lebanese Encyclopedia of Maronite Families (Notre Dame University, 2014) confirms the El Chemor (Ghassanid) family ruled in Koura (Lebanon) under Ottoman oversight from 1641–1747, and documents their origin from the medieval Ghassanid dynasty.
An international arbitration award (No. 0413/2011) legally affirmed Prince Gharios El Chemor’s rights and titles. This award, rendered in Brazil under Federal Law 9307/96, was recognized as equivalent to a court judgment and enforced in the U.S. (Los Angeles Superior Court, Feb. 2012) pursuant to the 1958 New York Convention.
Lebanese Presidential Decree 5800/2019 formally recognized the Sovereign Imperial and Royal House of Ghassan as an international nonprofit representing the Ghassanid Dynasty. The decree, approved by Lebanon’s Council of Ministers, acknowledged HRH Prince Sheikh Selim El Chemor as head of the family in Lebanon and HRH Prince Gharios as head of the House internationally.
In May 2017, the President of Lebanon publicly received Prince Gharios and his family in an official audience, with the presidency’s schedule and national media addressing him by his princely title. The President also accepted the Order of Michael Archangel from the Ghassanid House during that meeting, implicitly recognizing the House’s authority to bestow honors.
The Global Imams Council (a transnational body of over 1,000 Muslim leaders) issued a decree in 2020 recognizing “the sovereignty of the Ghassanid Kingdom and all its realms and titles” under Prince Gharios. This interfaith endorsement is unprecedented – a Muslim clerical council affirming a Christian imperial title – and it led to a cooperation agreement to protect religious minorities.
Classical international law doctrine supports the notion that deposed sovereigns retain their titles de jure until they consent to cede them. Textor’s Synopsis Juris Gentium (1680) stated a king ousted by force does not lose his right unless he formally renounces or his state is legitimately reconstituted. Oppenheim’s analysis of governments-in-exile notes that exile alone does not end a state’s sovereignty or a monarch’s authority, as demonstrated by WW2 exiled governments.
According to jurists, jus majestatis (the right of a sovereign to prestige and dignity) and jus honorum (the right to confer honors) remain with a dynasty even after losing the throne, and pass to its lawful heirs by inheritance. While the exercise of these rights can be limited by domestic law (e.g., republics may forbid title usage), their existence is not erased by any rule of international law. Each state decides whether to recognize such titles, but the prevailing view (reflected in practice) is that these dynastic rights persist in a private or honorific capacity.